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Abstract—We investigate a relay network where a multi-
antenna source can potentially utilize an unauthenticated (un-
trusted) relay to augment its direct transmission of a confidential
message to the destination. Since the relay is untrusted, it is desir-
able to protect the confidential data from it while simultaneously
making use of it to increase the reliability of the transmission.
We present a low-complexity scheme denoted as imbalanced
beamforming based on linear beamforming and constellation
mapping that ensures perfect physical-layer security even while
utilizing the untrusted relay. Furthermore, the security of the
scheme holds even if the relay adopts the conventional decode-
and-forward protocol, unlike prior work. Simulation results show
that the proposed imbalanced signaling maintains a constant
BER of 0.5 at the eavesdropper at any SNR and number of
source antennas, while maintaining or improving the detection
performance of the destination compared to not utilizing the relay
or existing security methods.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, untrusted relay.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a resurgence of interest in covert wireless
communications that are secure from eavesdropping at the
physical layer without relying on higher-layer encryption.
Information security is an important issue for both single-
hop links [1]-[3] and relay networks [4], in which secure
transmissions may be compromised by external eavesdroppers
that are distinct from the source and the relay nodes. Relays
can deploy well-known protocols such as amplify-and-forward
(AF), decode-and-forward (DF), and compress-and-forward
(CF) to aid the secure transmission of messages in the presence
of external eavesdroppers.
However, even if external eavesdroppers are absent, it may
still be desirable to keep the source signal confidential from
the relay node itself in spite of its assistance in forwarding the
data to the destination [5]. For example, the unauthenticated
relay may belong to a heterogeneous network without the same
security clearance as the source and destination. This scenario
has also been denoted as cooperative communication via an
untrusted relay in [6], [7], where the authors presented bounds
on the achievable secrecy rate.
Prior art on untrusted relays have focused on computing
either the information-theoretic system secrecy rate [5]-[8] or
the probability that it is in outage [9]. However, information-
theoretic measures such as secrecy rate generally rely on
idealized assumptions such as continuous (e.g., Gaussian)
input distributions and the existence of ‘good’ random coding
schemes with asymptotically long block-lengths. Therefore, in
order to account for practical codes with finite block lengths
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and discrete modulation alphabets, the authors of [10] advocate
the use of bit-error rate (BER) as a security metric, and define
physical-layer security to be the enforcement of 0.5 BER at the
eavesdropper while the destination BER is below a reliability
threshold. In [10], this was achieved by appropriate puncturing
of the output of a low-density parity check encoder at the
source for a single-hop network with an external eavesdropper.
In contrast, we present a low-complexity scheme for uncoded
MISO systems with an untrusted relay based on a combination
of transmit beamforming and constellation mapping for M -ary
phase-shift keying (PSK) or quadrature amplitude modulation
(QAM), that ensures the relay has a constant BER of 0.5 even
when it is utilized.
The contributions of this letter can therefore be summarized
as follows: (1) we propose a novel and low-complexity imbal-
anced beamforming (IBF) scheme where separate beamform-
ing vectors are applied to the real and imaginary components
of the transmitted symbol; (2) we define a class of bit-labeling
for various PSK and QAM constellations, that combined with
IBF provide perfect physical-layer security while using an
untrusted relay, (3) perfect security is obtained regardless of
the relaying protocol, while previously, untrusted relays could
not have employed DF, and (4) the proposed scheme out-
performs existing schemes based on generalized eigenvector
beamforming, artificial noise transmission by the source, and
cooperative jamming by the destination.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
A. Network Model
The network under consideration comprises a transmitter
with N antennas, while the intended destination and an unau-
thenticated relay have a single antenna each. A direct link is
assumed to exist between source and destination, and all nodes
operate in half-duplex mode. The transmitter wishes to convey
a confidential bit sequence m = {m0, . . . ,mK−1} ∈ [0, 1]K
to the destination, where each bit is assumed to be equally
likely. The transmitter can choose to utilize the relay to aug-
ment its transmission to the destination, but must ensure that
the relay cannot decode the message m itself. Alternatively,
the source can treat the relay purely as an eavesdropper and
only rely on the direct link to the destination.
The transmitter adopts a memoryless two-dimensional M -
ary modulation scheme such as PSK or QAM, by mapping q =
log2M bits at a time from m to a unit-power complex symbol
s = sR + jsI . Let the alphabets of the real and imaginary
components of s be denoted as SR = {sR,1, . . . , sR,|SR|} and
SI = {sI,1, . . . , sI,|SI |}, i.e., sR ∈ SR and sI ∈ SI . The ith
22D constellation point is mapped to a unique length-q binary
vector or bit pattern bi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,q], i = 1, . . . ,M .
In order to isolate the security gain with the proposed
scheme we consider an uncoded system, although a chan-
nel encoder can be incorporated without modification. In
the scenario where the source utilizes the relay, the overall
transmission time per symbol is split into two slots. In the
first time slot the source broadcasts signal xt ∈ CN×1 to the
relay and destination; in the second time slot it remains silent
while the relay transmits xr to the destination. Signals xt and
xr are functions of s and yr, respectively. The source and
relay each have transmit power constraints E
{
‖xt‖22
}
≤ Pt
and E
{
|xr|2
}
≤ Pr, respectively. The received signals at the
relay and destination over two time slots are then given by
yr = hrxt + nr (1)
yd,1 = hdxt + nd,1 (2)
yd,2 = gdxr + nd,2 (3)
where hr ∈ C1×N , hd ∈ C1×N , and gd are the source-to-
relay, source-to-destination, and relay-to-destination channels,
and nr, nd,1, nd,2 are independent complex additive white
Gaussian noise samples with variance N0/2 per real and imag-
inary dimensions. All channels and noise samples are mutually
independent. We assume the transmitter and relay both have
knowledge of all channel realizations, while the destination has
perfect receive channel state information (CSI) in both slots.
This is feasible since the relay is a cooperating node and not a
conventional passive eavesdropper, and has also been assumed
in [6]-[9]. Furthermore, both relay and destination know the
constellation mapping used by the transmitter. Therefore, the
security of the IBF scheme is not dependent upon the use of
CSI or constellation mapping as a shared secret key.
B. Existing Approaches
In the conventional case where the source does not utilize
the relay and treats it purely as an eavesdropper, the optimal
transmit signal that maximizes the secrecy rate1 is given by
[2, Theorem 2]
xt = ψmaxs (4)
where ψmax is the generalized eigenvector corresponding
to the largest generalized eigenvalue of the matrix pencil(
I+ Pth
H
r hr, I+ Pth
H
d hd
)
. In this scenario the relay stays
silent and the source transmits a new symbol in every time
slot. This scheme is referred to as generalized eigenvector
beamforming (GEBF) in Sec. IV.
Popular alternatives for secure transmission are schemes
based on artificial noise (AN) or destination jamming (DJ),
where the legitimate nodes deliberately transmit noise-like
signals to jam eavesdroppers [1], [3], [11]. In the AN scheme,
the transmitter splits its total power between the data symbol
and a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian AN symbol w in
time slot 1. Define the maximum ratio transmission (MRT)
beamforming vector as h˜Hd , hHd
/‖hd‖. The data is sent via
1This scheme assumes a Gaussian input distribution; a closed-form solution
for the optimal beamformer with finite inputs remains an open problem.
MRT, while the AN is transmitted in the orthogonal space of
the intended receiver’s channel:
xt =
√
βh˜Hd s+
√
Pt − β
(
h⊥d
)H
w (5)
where scalar 0 ≤ β ≤ Pt controls the power allocation
between data and AN. However, the destination cannot cancel
out the AN retransmitted to it in the second phase by the relay
for the AF scenario.
Under DJ, the transmitter sends only data via MRT while
other nodes jam eavesdroppers. In the absence of external
helpers, the destination node jams the untrusted relay in time
slot 1 and therefore does not receive information in this phase,
i.e., yd,1 = 0. The relay receives data along with the jamming
signal as
yr = hrxt + frw + nr
where fr is the destination-to-relay channel coefficient. When
the AF protocol is in effect, the destination can cancel out its
own jamming signals from yd,2.
III. IMBALANCED BEAMFORMING
A. Beamforming Design
The two major ingredients of the proposed imbalanced sig-
naling scheme are the beamforming design and constellation
mapping at the source. The main idea for the beamforming
design is to have the source construct xt such that only the real
(or imaginary) part of the confidential symbol s is received by
the relay, whereas the destination receives s in its entirety in
the first time slot. This is achieved as follows. Let Z represent
the orthonormal basis of the nullspace of hr, which implies
hrZ = 0. Given hr is rank-1, Z is comprised of N − 1
orthogonal vectors. Denoting an arbitrary column of Z by
h⊥r ∈ CN×1, the transmit signal is designed as
xt =
[ √
αh˜Hd
√
Pt − αh⊥r
] [
sR jsI
]T
=
√
αh˜Hd sR + j
√
Pt − αh⊥r sI (6)
where the scalar 0 < α ≤ Pt is used to preserve the power
constraint Pt. Therefore, separate beamformers (MRT and
nullspace) are applied to the real and imaginary components
of the confidential symbol to maximize and zero-force their
reception at the intended destination and relay, respectively.
B. Optimal Relay Eavesdropping
Based on the preceding discussion on the transmit beam-
forming design, the relay observes only the real part of the
confidential symbol:
yr =
√
αhrh˜
H
d sR + nr. (7)
Let y˜r , Re {yr} and gr =
√
αRe
{
hrh˜
H
d
}
. From the
perspective of physical-layer security, we make the worst-case
assumption that the untrusted relay utilizes an optimal bitwise
demodulator that minimizes its (uncoded) BER [12]:
Lj (y˜r) = log
Pr (Mj = 1|Yr = y˜r)
Pr (Mj = 0|Yr = y˜r) (8)
= log
∑
s∈SRj,1
e−(y˜r−grs)
2/N0
∑
s∈SRj,0
e−(y˜r−grs)
2/N0
, j = 1, . . . , q, (9)
3where SRj ,k = {sR,i ∈ SR : bi,j = k, ∀i}, q = log2M as
before, and we have exploited that the likelihood function
of the received signal in (7) is Gaussian when conditioned
on the message and channel. The likelihood ratio test at the
relay is effectively the optimal bitwise 1D pulse-amplitude
modulation detector [12, Sec. II-B] with alphabet SR, since
only the real dimension is observed. Note that (8) would need
to be modified when considering a coded system. By correctly
detecting sR the relay narrows the number of possible values
of the symbol s to M/2, but with appropriate constellation
mapping the a posteriori uncertainty per individual bits can
remain unchanged, as explained next.
C. Constellation Mapping
The second facet of the IBF scheme is the assignment
of bit patterns to the constellation points. There are M !
possible mappings of bit patterns to constellation points at
the transmitter, with Gray coding being a classical example. In
the sequel we assume SR and SI are each 1D PAM alphabets.
Let the (dc × q) binary matrix Bc represent all the bit patterns
associated with the cth element of SR, c = 1, . . . , |SR|, where
the kth row of Bc is the binary vector mapped to the complex
symbol sR,c + jsI,k. For QPSK/8-PSK we have dc = 2, and
dc = |SI | for square QAM constellations, ∀c. For rectangular
32-QAM and 128-QAM constellations, dc = 4 and dc = 8 for
extremal elements of SR; dc = |SI | for all other elements.
Definition 1: An E-map is defined as a constellation bit
mapping wherein for every real-dimensional coordinate sR,c ∈
SR, the mapping matrix Bc has an equal number of 1s and
0s in each of its q columns.
The above definition implies that an E-map can be con-
structed only when dc is even. Fortunately, E-maps can be eas-
ily constructed for commonly-used 2D M -ary constellations,
and several existing constellation labels satisfy this property:
• QPSK: Anti-Gray mapping.
• 8-PSK: The mapping proposed in Fig. 1.
• 16 QAM: Anti-Gray mapping.
• 32-QAM/128-QAM: Approximate Anti-Gray mapping.
• 64 QAM: The “D5” mapping in [13].
• 256-QAM: The TV-map in [14, pg. 5046].
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Fig. 1. E-map for 8-PSK. Bc is of dimension (2 × 3) ∀c.
E-maps are not unique since row and column permutations of
Bc also yield an E-map. E-maps are expected to lead to a
slight increase in BER at the intended destination at low SNR
compared to conventional Gray mapping, but perfect physical-
layer security is ensured as described next, since the equivo-
cation at the relay of the transmitted symbol is maximized.
We reiterate that the relay has complete knowledge of all CSI
and the E-map used by the source.
Proposition 1: The imbalanced beamforming scheme with
E-maps provides perfect physical-layer security at any SNR
and number of transmit antennas N , regardless of the relaying
protocol.
Proof : The detection of sR by the relay in (7) is equivalent
to |SR|-PAM demodulation. Conditioned on correct PAM
detection, for every transmitted symbol the relay must attempt
to determine the associated bit sequence by choosing the
correct row from the associated mapping matrix Bc. Without
knowledge of imaginary component sI , the best the relay can
do is to randomly pick a row from Bc. By definition, under
E-maps each column of Bc has an equal number of 1s and
0s, and therefore the relay will correctly pick each individual
transmit bit with probability 1/2. Hence, the relay BER is
constantly 0.5 at any SNR, whereas the BER at the destination
is bounded away from 0.5 as Pt, Pr, or N increase since it
receives both real and imaginary components of s. 
To complete the description of the relay system, we outline
the destination processing for AF and DF relay protocols.
When the AF protocol is deployed by the relay, its transmit
signal is given by xr =
√
γ Re{yr}, where γ enforces the
relay power constraint Pr. The destination aggregates the
signals received over two time slots into yd = [yd,1,yd,2]T ,
equivalent to
yd =
[ √
αhdh˜
H
d
√
Pt − αhdh⊥r√
αγ Re
{
hrh˜
H
d
}
0
][
sR
jsI
]
+
[
nd,1
n˜d,2
]
(10)
where the effective noise term is
n˜d,2 =
√
γgdRe {nr}+ nd,2. The destination retrieves
the MMSE estimate of [sR, jsI ]T as
sˆt =
[
HeH
H
e +
[
2N0 0
0 2Pr|gd|2 + 2N0
]]−1
HHe yd (11)
where He is the (2 × 2) equivalent channel in (10), and
then performs minimum-distance detection for the associated
E-map. Under the DF protocol, we have xr =
√
Pr sˆR,
where sˆR is the relay’s estimate of the real component of
s with corresponding BER as in [15], and the extension of the
destination detection under AF is straightforward. When the
relay is not utilized as in GEBF, yd,2 = 0 and the destination
performs minimum-distance detection based on yd,1.
We conclude this section by briefly describing how im-
balanced signaling can be applied to the scenarios where all
terminals have a single antenna, or where the relay has more
antennas than the source. Since no spatial degrees-of-freedom
are now available to conceal the imaginary component sI from
the relay, we must resort to non-linear transmission schemes
such as dirty-paper coding [16] to achieve this. In all cases, the
E-map design would remain unchanged, and perfect physical-
layer security can still be ensured.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We present some examples that validate the security of
the proposed IBF scheme in comparison with the existing
artificial noise (AN) and destination jamming (DJ) schemes
4from Sec. II-B, using E-maps in all cases. The channels and
background noise samples are assumed to be composed of
independent, zero-mean Gaussian random variables with unit
variance. In AN schemes, it has been observed previously that
allocating power roughly equally between AN and data is a
good rule of thumb for ergodic secrecy rate maximization,
and performance is not very sensitive to small variations in
β [3]. We roughly follow this rule of thumb with fractionally
a little more power (β = 0.7Pt) allocated for the data. For
the IBF scheme, the source allocates equal power to the real
and imaginary components by setting α = 0.5Pt. For DJ, the
extra destination jamming power is set to 0.5Pt in addition to
transmitter power Pt, i.e., there is no power sharing between
transmitter and destination.
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Fig. 2. BER with 16-QAM E-map and DF relay.
Fig. 2 compares the relay and destination BER with 16-
QAM E-map versus Pt under the proposed IBF and conven-
tional GEBF schemes, for N = 4 antennas and DF relaying
with Pr = 40. It is apparent that from a BER perspective, the
GEBF fails to provide security as the source transmit power
increases, whereas the IBF scheme constantly maintains a BER
of 0.5 at the relay even though it employs the DF protocol. AN
and DJ provide relay BER of around 0.4 at high SNR, but have
very poor destination performance due to wastage of transmit
power and sacrificing the direct link signal, respectively. At
low transmit SNRs the destination has a slightly higher BER
under IBF since the relay signal is not wholly reliable, but this
disparity disappears as the SNR increases. Thus, IBF offers the
best combination of security and destination reliability.
Fig. 3 considers the 8-PSK E-map of Fig. 1, as source an-
tenna number N increases with fixed powers Pt = Pr = 100
and AF relaying. Once again, the IBF scheme constantly
maintains a BER of 0.5 at the relay for all array sizes, while the
GEBF scheme does not reach this mark even for large values
of N . The destination BER under IBF is simultaneously lower
than GEBF, since the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination
SNRs are both high enough to ensure that the relay provides a
strong diversity benefit when utilized. DJ and AN both suffer
due to the wastage of relay power in retransmitting jamming
noise. The destination BER of DJ is further degraded due to
sacrificing the direct link, in spite of perfect jamming signal
cancelation.
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Fig. 3. BER with 8-PSK E-map and AF relay.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter we presented a low-complexity scheme denoted
as imbalanced beamforming based on linear beamforming
and constellation mapping that ensures perfect physical-layer
security even while utilizing an untrusted relay, when a direct
link to the destination is also available. Simulations showed
that the proposed imbalanced signaling maintains a constant
BER of 0.5 at the eavesdropper at any SNR and number of
source antennas, while improving the detection performance
of the destination compared to not utilizing the relay.
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